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There has been an outpouring of recent research on the question of the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Chinese renminbi, with a number of economists making a case for much larger renminbi revaluation than the initial 2% shift announced on July 21, 2005. Notwithstanding any external effects this policy move may have, allowing some freedom from the fixed exchange rate constraint promises to increase the People's Bank of China's scope for effective monetary control. Ba Shusong, deputy director-general of the Finance Institute of the State Council's Development Research Center, for example, emphasized that the fixed exchange rate had "jeopardized" the independence of Chinese monetary policy. 1 In this study we find a consistent monetary policy response to real output that is combined, however, with apparent sensitivity to external pressures. The movement away from the fixed exchange rate policy may well reflect the Chinese authorities' awareness of the benefits for monetary policymaking rather than necessarily representing a response to foreign demands for exchange rate adjustment.
In recent years monetary policy analysis has been increasingly dominated by the estimation of the
ATaylor rule@ (Taylor, 1993) , whereby central bank interest-rate setting is related to the gap between inflation and its target value and the gap between actual real GDP and its potential level. When interest rates are already very low, a problem with the Taylor rule is that it may call for negative interest rates that cannot be delivered in practice, however. In such cases as Japan, therefore, McCallum=s (1988) alternative rule based on explaining movements in the monetary base as a function of GDP and velocity growth may be more applicable (see also McCallum, 1993; . In this paper we consider how this same AMcCallum rule@ may also be applied to China. Estimation of a Taylor rule would not be sensible here as not only does the People's Bank of China not have a target interest rate as such but also loan and deposit rates are still largely administratively determined. Only recently has any movement from the specified interest rates been permitted. And, when the People=s Bank of China announced a rise in loan Chinese inflation and M2 money growth after 1990 is apparent in Figure 1 . 
The Role of Monetary Policy in China
Prior work has examined money demand in China and tested for causality between money and prices and money and output. Chen (1997) identification of a continued decline in velocity as income rose over the sample is a trend that continues after 1990 (see, for example, Burdekin, 2000) with the Chinese economy becoming increasingly highly monetized. 6 In the absence of further financial liberalization, however, interest rates continue to be largely administratively-determined even today --making their influence on money demand hard to interpret with Zhang (2003) , for example, finding the interest rate to be insignificant in influencing money demand in the post-reform period.
Recent evidence on the link between money and prices in China is mixed. 7 Both Zhang (2003) and Sun and Ma (2004) find some support for such a link but Zhang (2003) finds an additional role for real variables and Sun and Ma (2004) find the money supply to be endogenous with respect to prices. An accommodative, rather than causal role, for money supply movements in China is also seen by Zhang and Wan (2004) . But Zhang and Wan (2004) , while finding a key role for price expectations in influencing money, prices and output alike, do also point to greater stability in the relationship of M2 (the aggregate emphasized by the People=s Bank) with output and prices and find evidence of a cointegrating relationship between M2, prices and output. 8 6 Qin (2003) demonstrates how the increased channeling of household savings into bank deposits lies behind China=s unusually large, and growing, M2/GDP ratio.
There is also the question of structural breaks. Even restricting attention to just the 1990-2002 period, Sun and Ma (2004) find that the effect of the different monetary aggregates (monetary base, M1
and M2) on prices disappears after the onset of deflation in 1998. There are many reasons why monetary policy may become less effective once deflation has set in, including the postponement of non-essential purchases when prices are expected to fall over time (for a review, see Burdekin and Siklos, 2004) . In
China's case, the more than halving of the M2 growth rate from 34.5% in 1994 to 14.8% in 1998 was accompanied by a 23.7% drop in the (M2) velocity of circulation and a marked acceleration in savings growth relative to consumption (see Xu, 2002) . The initial deflation coincided with the onset of the Asian financial crisis, with the decline in the consumer price index itself driven by a sharp drop in food prices that averaged -3.2% in 1998 and -4.2% in 1999 (Wu, 2004, p. 37) . Elimination of tariffs as China joined the WTO may also have extended the deflationary trend, as well as helping to account for the fact that wholesale prices dropped so much more than consumer prices in 2001 (Dai, 2002 . Although we cannot account for such Astructural@ factors as WTO accession, we do allow for a parameter shift associated with the onset of deflation in 1998 B and (contrary to find this effect to be highly significant. 
where A key empirical problem is the absence of a regularly-provided official target for nominal GDP growth, however. Chinese officials have at times referred to targeted real growth in the high single digits and, even in the face of the Asian financial crisis, still maintained a 9% target for real growth (Wong, 1998, p. 38) . Combining that with single-digit inflation suggests an implicit target nominal GDP growth rate in the range of 10-20%, depending upon exactly how much attempted restraint is to be imposed on inflation. The 2005 targets (People=s Bank of China, 2004b, p. 42) of 8% real growth and 4% inflation yield a 12% implied rate of nominal GDP growth. Actual nominal GDP growth rose above 30% in the face of the 1993-1994 inflation spike, however, before dropping to around 10% at the end of the 1990s and then rising again towards the end of our sample period.
In our analysis, the unobservable target nominal GDP growth is modeled based on the trend properties of the raw data, which is both required by the absence of a consistent series of official target values and also is in keeping with the longstanding Friedmanite rationale for linking money growth to trend growth in output. A quarterly 3.75% growth rate, with a stochastic component around this growth rate, appears to capture the slowdown in GDP growth beginning in the 1ate 1990s. 12 The resulting series, together with actual GDP, is plotted in Figure 2 . With M2 and the monetary base both used as proxies for ∆m t , the rate of change of the resulting velocity estimates (GDP divided by each money supply measure), is plotted in Figure 3 .
Next, we proceed with two ways to implement equation ( Taylor (1993) , it seems appropriate to allow the response to the nominal GDP gap to be determined by the data -as well as allow for other potentially relevant factors. negative and statistically significant. 13 We allowed for the addition of a dummy variable set equal to one from 1997 on, thereby distinguishing the period following the onset of deflation (at the time of the Asian financial crisis) from the inflationary period that preceded it (cf, Sun and Ma, 2004) . The results in the second column of Table 1 show that the estimated coefficient on β 1 remains negative but is now statistically insignificant when base money growth is the dependent variable. However, with both M2 and the monetary base, the deflation dummy variable is highly significant and, as one would expect, negative. Examining the fitted values of the regression (not shown) suggests that monetary policy was too tight in 1991-1992 and again in 1998-1999 while the same policy was too loose during 1992-1997.
This suggests the generation of inflationary pressure until the mid to late 1990s, followed by a drop off, which is precisely in line with what transpired in practice.
The specification of our deflation variable is arguably somewhat ad hoc. Consequently, we next estimated alternative versions of (2) 
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GDP is concerned, this implies a procyclical policy response (cf, Zhang and Wan, 2004) . The coefficient on the real exchange rate variable is negative and statistically significant, at least at the 5% level, indicating that real exchange rate depreciation led to a negative (countercyclical) monetary policy response, however. Meanwhile, the weaker link between foreign exchange reserves and money growth may be indicative of People's Bank of China success at sterilizing inflows of foreign exchange.
The estimates to date may not accurately reflect the People's Bank of China's true reaction to these variables, however, as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates co-mingle the central bank's policy response with the more general economy-wide reactions. This is due to the endogeneity of the right-hand side variables in equation (2). Hence, the final column of Table 1 displays the results arising from estimation via the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The constant, deflation dummy, two lags of each of the variables in the equation, and two lags in export growth were used as instruments.
One cannot reject that the resulting over-identifying restrictions are correctly specified.
While the results are not greatly affected by this change in estimation approaches, it is notable that the real exchange rate variable is no longer significant in any of the regressions. The coefficient on the foreign exchange reserves variable in Table 1A suggests that M2 growth increases or decreases significantly as reserves are above or below trend -thereby implying that the People's Bank of China is not able to sterilize inflows completely. When the monetary base is the dependent variable (Table 1B) 
Long-Run Estimates and Inflation Forecasting
While the foregoing results shed some light on the reactions of the People's Bank of China, an alternative approach consists in estimating a money demand function and comparing the estimates with the actual money supply data in order to derive the gap between the actual and predicted values, referred to as the "money gap." As outlined in Adam and Hendry (1999) , the money gap has been found to by the Bank of Canada to be a useful indicator of inflationary pressure. Estimation of the money gap proceeds in two steps. The signs for the long-run elasticities are as predicted by theory. Not surprisingly, however, the sign on the interest elasticity, while negative and statistically significant, is economically small. In contrast, the price elasticity is greater than one and suggestive of rising real balances in the long-run. 15 The income elasticity is also larger than one and likely reflects the impact of strong economic growth throughout the sample period. People's Bank policy appears responsive to the gap between target and actual nominal GDP as well as to external pressures. We also find evidence of a policy shift as deflation set in during 1998 following the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Additional longer-run analysis reveals cointegration between the People's Bank's M2 target aggregate and prices, real output and interest rates. Estimates of the gap between estimated money demand and actual money supply appear to track quite well the swings between inflationary and deflationary pressures over our sample period. This suggests that Chinese inflation and monetary policy outcomes can be satisfactorily modeled using standard empirical techniques and are not just a figment of China-specific "structural" factors.
(with falling velocity) followed by a growing financial sophistication phase (reflected in rising velocity), howeversee Siklos (1993) and the references therein. Note: Estimates in the first three columns are based on OLS; GMM estimates were used in the last column.
1 indicates J-test for over-identifying restrictions. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% (** 5% level). Note: Updating refers to the addition of new data as they become available. The no-updating case uses information from the estimated sample only. See text and Table 1 for additional details, sources and definition of series.
